Internet voting has been very topical and it has been used in elections in North America, Europe, and elsewhere. The advantages of its use include increased participation from infirmed, elderly, and itinerant voters and quicker vote tabulation. Its disadvantages stem from the inherent lack of control and transparency from allowing votes from homes and other locations rather than from controlled polling stations, which may lead to voter fraud or inadvertent spoilage of "virtual" ballots. Much of this balancing-off of pros and cons is done on a qualitative basis with little attempt at quantifying the risks using an established methodology. The application of a well-known risk analysis method OCTAVE has merely been proposed. In this paper, we extend this general proposal and describe key constructs for applying OCTAVE to perform risk analysis for voting alternatives in general. Governments or other institutions can then use this methodology to perform quantitative risk analysis to compare different voting alternatives including Internet voting, as well as poll, mail-in, and telephone voting.
Introduction
Internet voting (I-voting) has the potential to increase election turnout by providing voters with a convenient voting mode that does not require them to leave their homes or offices. Even geographic distance is no longer a limitation on participation in elections as soldiers, students, tourists, and business people can exercise their civic right and vote from anywhere around the world regardless of any time differences. If this is not enough, consider the ease with which the elderly and the disabled can vote and add to that cost savings from using a freely available technological infrastructure (i.e., the Internet) and privately owned personal computers. Since many democracies are faced with an everdecreasing voting rate, the opportunity to turn the tide and increase turnout seems particularly promising.
Nonetheless, I-voting is not a panacea. There are no guarantees that voting rates will go up once I-voting becomes widely available. Even if more people exercise their right to vote there is no assurance that they will do so out of their free will and not because they are coerced. In addition, there is much technological vulnerability in I-voting that exposes the elections to subversion by undemocratic forces.
Clearly, making a decision one way or the other must weigh the pros and cons of adding Internet-based ballot casting to the existing voting modes. Currently there is no adequate framework that can be used to compare the risks and gain of various voting modes in a quantifiable way. This paper proposes such a framework and argues that governments and other institutions would benefit from using it to evaluate different voting modes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the benefits and risks associated with I-voting. Section 3 introduces a risk-analysis method -OCTAVE and argues that it can be used for comparing different voting modes. Section 4 extends and adapts OCTAVE to allow for the comparison of different voting modes. Section 5 presents a brief example of this, and in Section 6, concluding remarks and future work are stated.
I-Voting: Pros and Cons
Proponents of I-voting argue that it will increase election turnout because it provides voters with a convenient voting mechanism, which does not require them to leave the comfort of their homes. Voting rates will also go up because the sick and the disabled will find the process less demanding. Voting via the Internet can be done around the clock and the costs associated with it are expected to be lower, thus saving tax payers' money (Mohen and Glidden 2001) . Opponents of I-voting disagree. They argue that providing voters with yet another voting mechanism is not going to increase voting rates, at least not once the novelty of the process is gone. To support their counter view they claim that when American voters were given the option to vote early or via absentee mail-in, turnout did not increase and in fact current voting rates are steadily heading downward. The opponents also claim that the exposure of the technical systems underlying I-voting to malicious attacks by radicals, terrorists, and others who may gain from swinging elections is a threat to the foundations of democracy. The potential for an increased turnout is not enough to justify the risk of losing voters' trust in the system (Di Franco et al. 2004; Mercuri 2002; Mercuri and Camp 2004; Neumann 2001; Phillips and von Spakovsky 2001) .
The attacks an I-voting system are exposed to include Trojan horses, spyware, viruses, worms, spoofing, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and more (Lauer 2004) . Some of these attacks are designed to hurt the voting process in general (e.g., DoS attacks) where as other may be used to swing elections (e.g., Trojan horses). The source of the attack could be a trusted insider so physical measures of security (smart-cards, biometrics, etc.) may not be particularly helpful. Supporters of I-voting try to assure those opposing it that it is possible to guard against attacks directed toward the technological infrastructure by various physical and network security measures. For example, intrusion-detection software can be used to deal with DoS attacks. The use of public and private keys to encrypt private votes and by relying on secure socket layers to transmit them is effective against spoofing. Physical measures include placing host servers at undisclosed locations and continuously replicating them to clone servers. Once ballots are cast, voters' privacy can be guaranteed by splitting election data into two. One data source will be used to store votes thus allowing vote counting while the second data source serves to record voters' actions without actually identifying their voting decisions. It is recommended that a trusted 3 rd -party will be used to store and count the votes (Mohen and Glidden 2001) .
The abovementioned security measures do not satisfy those who challenge I-voting. Following the Arizona Democratic Party's presidential preference primary, the chairman of the Technology Committee of the California Internet Voting Task Force, David Jefferson, claimed it was possible to hack into the hosting servers and make them inoperable and to infect voters' computers with viruses capable of changing votes and ultimately results of elections. Another important drawback of I-voting systems, directly related to the numerous technical problems, is their inability to provide proper auditing of the voting process. The refusal of I-voting hosts to open their proprietary systems to public scrutiny does not help lower the concerns expressed by I-voting challengers (For an excellent review of pros and cons of source availability, see Kitcat 2004 ). Finally, a key element in ensuring fairness in the process is the presence of independent observers in polling places. Once the polling place becomes the voter's private home, placing independent observers to monitor the process is no longer an option. (Phillips and von Spakovsky 2001) .
While proponents and opponents disagree in their visions as to the role played by the Internet in future elections they both agree that the risk of losing voter's trust in the voting system is far too great to allow I-voting for presidential elections and instead suggest that voting via the Internet should be used for election where less is at stake. School board elections and municipal elections are good starting points for testing the system in a live mode. The gains and risks associated with I-voting are dependent on the type of election. School board elections may have less to gain by an increase in voter turnout than do national elections but the risks associated with a failure are also less significant. The evaluation of I-voting risks is discussed next.
A Risk Evaluation Framework
Government bodies contemplating the use of I-voting instead of, or in addition to existing voting methods must evaluate its advantages and disadvantages relative to other modes of holding elections. For the most part, evaluation of alternatives has been done qualitatively and was largely based on anecdotal evidence. Proper evaluation of the positive and negative aspects of the different modes of voting should be done in a more systematic, holistic, and quantifiable way. A good framework must be able to identify the threats, their likelihood and magnitude, and provide a basis for developing counter measures. Once these are identified and quantified they can be compared to the perceived benefits and together, the risks and the gains, could be used for making a decision on the voting modes. The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) approach (http://www.sei.cmu.edu/pub/documents/99.reports/pdf/99tr017.pdf) is a promising starting point in the search for an appropriate framework for evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of using Internet voting. The framework requires extensions and adaptations to make it more fitting for the purposes of evaluating different alternative voting methods according to their risks and gains.
The OCTAVE approach (Alberts et al. 1999; Alberts and Dorofee 2003) has been used before to identify some of the risks associated with electronic voting (Lauer 2004) . Electronic voting includes direct recording electronic (DRE) voting and Internet voting (I-voting). We argue that by broadening OCTAVE and supplementing it with a few key constructs it would be possible not only to identify the risks associated with I-voting but also to compare this method to more traditional methods thus providing decision-makers with a tool to justify switching to Internet-based voting, or adding I-voting to the existing modes.
OCTAVE is a risk-analysis approach that identifies assets, threats to those assets, and protective measures with their costs and effectiveness. In the context of voting, assets are components of the election process that impact citizens' trust in the voting process. Therefore, artefacts such as uncompleted and completed ballots as well as the list of electors are assets for voting. The likelihood and magnitude of the risk to each asset and the ability to guard against them and the costs associated with protecting them need to be parts of the risk-analysis framework.
OCTAVE is built on the premise that an Actor (a person, a group, or an organization) has a Motive (e.g., to see a candidate lose) which he or she intends to pursue by gaining Access (e.g., hacking into the election system) to an Asset (e.g., votes database), for the purpose of creating some negative Outcome (e.g., affecting the elections). The capitalized words are key elements in a threat profile and are required for the purpose of developing a counter measure plan. Using OCTAVE to conduct a risk-analysis involves executing the following three steps (Lauer 2004 ): Identifying (step 1) the assets, the threats associated with each asset, the existing protective measures and the required protective measures; deriving (step 2) the technological problems and their probable solutions, and; concluding with a plan (step 3) that identifies the risks and suggests measures to mitigate them.
Extending OCTAVE to Allow for a Comparison of the Risks Associated with the Different Voting Methods
In its present form, the OCTAVE approach is not suitable for conducting a risk analysis for multiple voting modes and comparing between them based on those risks. Therefore, it is necessary to modify the approach for this purpose. The key to a successful multimode risk analysis is the identification of a common set of constructs relevant to all the voting modes. The first step involves identifying the various voting modes. In addition to Internet voting and the standard secret ballot there are the direct recording electronic (DRE) and the mail-in absentee (e.g., http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/abinfo.htm) and telephone/IVR voting modes (for example, see http://www.phonelect.com/). Each carries its own risks and gains. It is important to note that often government bodies employ a mixture of voting modes (For example, the city of Markham in Ontario offered advance voting and Internet voting in addition to the standard secret ballot during the 2003 municipal election http://www.markham.ca/vote2003/voteinfo.asp).
After identifying the voting modes it is necessary to recognize the assets that are exposed to threats, the threats and their sources, the likelihood of the threat and their consequences, and the security measures intended to mitigate and counter the threats. As was mentioned in the previous section, in the case of government elections the assets to be protected are unmarked and completed ballots as well as the electors list. The ultimate identification of the relevant assets in the case of election is the responsibility of the government and the public. The technology-related threats are DoS and Distributed Dos (DDoS) attacks on the hosting servers, Trojan horses and spyware intended to modify or track votes, viruses and worms, spoofing, theft of post-election voters' data, identity theft (Smith 2005) , and attacks by insiders. Exposing the threats should be a joined effort by the government and the technologists hosting the electronic election.
The consequences can be of four types -disenfranchisement, vote theft, loss of privacy, and compromise of election (Lauer 2004) . Each type will have a different effect on voters' trust in the voting system. If this trust is broken, its effect on a democracy can be severe. This part of the risk analysis process is the sole responsibility of the public and the government and it does not require the involvement of the hosting firm, the trusted 3 rd -party, or any technology providers. The likelihood of each threat depends on the type of election (e.g., municipal, national, county etc.), on the particular political environment, on the e-infrastructure (Yu and Fang 2005) and on the on the e-readiness of the economy -i.e., the availability of tools and techniques to execute these attacks (Ifinedo and Davidrajuh 2005) . In addition, the security and enforcement mechanisms also affect the likelihood of encountering such attacks. Likelihood can be assessed in a qualitative way -i.e., rare, uncommon, very common, etc. -or it can be estimated quantitatively if there are known probabilities that can be associated with each threat. This phase and the next one should involve all the stakeholders of the I-voting process -i.e., the public, the government, the hosting firm, and the trusted 3 rd -party. Finally, counter measures are a function of existing technological knowledge by the government and the hosting firms and the 3 rd parties whom they have contracted to secure the votes. Counter measures are also a function of the geographical source of the attack. Attacks that are launched from outside the borders of a country are harder to counteract than those whose origin is inside the country. Compartmentalization of data is considered a basic step in providing counter measures against attacks. Non-disclosure of location of hosting servers is also considered good practice. Logging and auditing access to data, software, and hardware is also important.
It is important to recognize that although the debate over I-voting has been revolving around risks associated with malicious attacks intended to swing the elections these are by no means the only risks to I-voting. Voting via the Internet may fail because of accidental and unintended misuse of the system. The framework developed in this paper is appropriate for assessing intentional as well as unintentional threats.
How to compare different alternatives: A brief example
Different modes or alternatives of voting are means by which voters access the opportunity to vote. Hence what is called access in OCTAVE can also be called alternatives. A local township in North America was considering three different alternatives: traditional poll, Internet, and mail-in voting.
The key challenge in using OCTAVE for their situation was that there were different assets to protect depending on the alternative. For the poll and mail-in alternatives, the unmarked ballots were an important asset to protect. For Internet voting, there are no physical ballots. It was possible to categorize these different assets under a few asset types by making some reasonable assertions. For instance, the Website itself can be considered an unmarked ballot since it directly provides the right to vote in a similar way as the physical unmarked ballots. In a similar vein, the term, electors list, was used to describe collection of all records-whether this was paper-based or resident on a database-that kept track of eligible voters and whether or not they had already voted. Doing this allowed the township to describe other properties of threats straightforwardly according to actors, intent, and outcome. Then it was possible to compare similar threats of different alternatives; that is, to compare "apples to apples."
For instance let's take the following partial characterization:
Outsider (a non-voter)
Interruption of access For the poll voting alternative, an example of this could be a political organization from outside the township that decided to engage people outside the polling stations in political conversation, effectively delaying voters' access to vote. For the I-voting alternative, an example of this characterization could be a denial-of-service attack that slows the Website or even shuts it down for a few minutes or extended period of time. The point here is that though these two appear to be very different threats, they can be classified as the same type of threat for different alternatives. This actually allowed the township to put a score on each threat and to summarize up to put a total score on each alternative. That's rather obvious. As well though, because each threat was classified this way, it was possible for the township to for instance put scores on deliberate versus intentional threats, or quantitatively compare the threats due to the various actors.
Concluding Remarks and Future Work
More and more, governments are institutions are contemplating running elections with some I-voting component, either exclusively or in conjunction with other modes of voting such as traditional poll voting or even mail-in voting. We explore many of the issues that these organizations must address in deciding on which alternative to adopt. Beyond that, these organizations need an objective means to compare different voting alternatives, and in particular, evaluate risks associated with the alternatives. We show how it is possible to just as similarly evaluate risks of different alternatives as it is to evaluate risks posed by different stakeholders to the election-e.g. the organization, the voters, Internet users and hackers-as it is to compare deliberate versus accidental threats.
The obvious future work motivated from this paper is the application of this methodology to a real-life example. We are currently involved in a project wherein we are applying this methodology for a North American township, which is contemplating running an election that entails one or more of traditional poll, Internet, mail-in, and telephone voting. Preliminary results indicate that the methodology described in this paper allow decision-makers to better assess risks-i.e. "compare apples to apples."
